The Better Angels of Our Nature: How the Antiprejudice Norm Affects Policy and Party Preferences in Great Britain and Germany

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Existing research on public opinion related to race and immigration politics emphasizes the role of prejudice or bias against minority groups. We argue that the social norm against prejudice, and individual motivations to comply with it, are crucial elements omitted from prior analyses. In contemporary Western societies, most citizens receive strong signals that prejudice is not normatively acceptable. We demonstrate that many majority-group individuals have internalized a motivation to control prejudiced thoughts and actions and that this motivation influences their political behavior in predictable ways. We introduce measures capturing this motivation, develop hypotheses about its influence, and test these hypotheses in three separate experimental and nonexperimental survey studies conducted in Britain and Germany. Our findings support a dual-process model of political behavior suggesting that while many voters harbor negative stereotypes, they—particularly when certain contextual signals are present—strive to act in accordance with the “better angels of their natures.”

Following several decades of high immigration rates and growing ethnic diversity, immigration and the integration of new immigrant minorities have become salient and contentious political issues in Europe (Ivarsflaten 2008; Kriesi et al. 2008; Sides and Citrin 2007). Widespread anxieties have had a real—but limited—influence on political behaviors and election outcomes. While some right-wing populist parties have experienced spectacular electoral successes in Western Europe, traditional extreme-right parties, particularly older ones with historical legacies of fascism and explicit racism, have attracted only a fraction of the large electorate with negative views about immigration or diversity (Art 2011; Arzheimer 2009; Ignazi 2005; Ivarsflaten 2005; Kitschelt 1995; Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005). Why have anti-immigrant sentiments not resulted in more votes for traditional extreme-right parties? More generally, what factors determine the impact of anti-immigrant sentiment on political attitudes and behaviors?

We contend in this article that many white majority voters in Western Europe are of two minds about
immigration and minority politics and that this internal conflict affects their expressed policy preferences and vote choices in predictable ways. On one hand, many citizens harbor negative opinions and stereotypes about out-groups such as asylum seekers, immigrants, Muslims, and ethnic and racial minorities, and these attitudes often influence political preferences (e.g., Coenders et al. 2008; McLaren and Johnson 2007; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). On the other hand, we argue, individuals respond to, and often internalize, a widespread social norm against prejudice and discrimination. We argue that the internalized motivation to avoid prejudice has a significant impact on mass political behavior, an impact that can be distinguished qualitatively and quantitatively from the mere absence of prejudice. Citizens who have internalized this social norm are personally motivated to avoid acting on biases against stigmatized minorities, even if they, knowingly or unknowingly, harbor such biases.

Incorporating a broad social norm into models of individuals’ political preference formation yields substantial new theoretical and empirical insights. Theoretically, our main contribution is to conceive of political behavior as based on a “dual process” model of intergroup attitudes. Individuals’ political choices depend directly on both their personal level of motivation to control prejudice and the extent to which the context of choice triggers this motivation. Empirically, our experiments and analyses make novel contributions by showing that the internalized antiprejudice norm makes majority-group Europeans less likely to endorse discriminatory policies and less likely to be persuaded by antiminority political messages when contextual triggers of the norm are present.

Of particular substantive interest for political scientists, we show that political parties’ fascist legacies function as contextual triggers of the antiprejudice norm and that those European voters who are in two minds about immigration and minority politics therefore distance themselves from such parties and their policy proposals. As a consequence, the potential appeal of parties with unambiguous extreme-right historical legacies is inherently limited. It does not extend to all Europeans with negative biases or anti-immigration preferences but is instead limited to the much narrower group who lack motivation to avoid prejudice. Thus, our model provides a key to understanding not only the microlevel psychology of preferences on immigration and integration but also the macrolevel puzzle of why some political parties and certain political campaigns in Europe successfully mobilize anti-immigrant sentiment, while others largely fail.

The Dual-Process Logic

Citizens casting ballots, respondents answering survey questions, and individuals forming opinions about political campaigns are all engaged in forms of political behavior that involve cognitive activity. Such cognitive activity can be described in terms of a dual-process model involving automatic and controlled components of attitudes. Dual-process models, widely used across social psychology (Chaiken and Trope 1999), are especially prominent in research on prejudice (Devine 1989; Dovidio and Gaertner 2010; Payne and Gawronski 2010; Petty, Fazio, and Briñol 2009). Since the dual-process model we apply hinges on the distinction between automatic and controlled cognition, we briefly outline both components here. The contributions of this article focus on the controlled side.¹

Automatically activated or “implicit” attitudes are like gut reactions, instinctive and reflexive. A stimulus, such as an image of a human face, can generate automatic responses, such as the activation of emotion or of cognitive associations with other people or concepts. Automatic responses to a human face often vary with visible features of the stimulus image, such as gender, race/ethnicity, and age. Researchers have used this knowledge to construct implicit measures of bias such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) (Greenwald et al. 1998; Payne et al. 2005).

In contrast, controlled or explicit attitudes involve cognitive effort and perhaps even reflection (Gilbert and Hixon 1991; Muraven and Baumeister 2000). Controlled-attitude expressions are goal directed, shaped by the individual’s efforts to control the version of the self that she presents to the outside world, or even the version that she believes internally about herself. People may use this sort of cognitive effort to avoid expressing negative stereotypes or to prevent negative stereotypes from influencing other forms of behavior (Crandall and Eshleman 2003; Dunton and Fazio 1997; Plant and Devine 2009).

Research in political behavior has begun to incorporate a dual-process logic but mainly by adding implicit attitude measures. The IAT and AMP were included in the 2008 American National Election Study and predicted presidential vote choice over and above conventional survey measures of prejudice (Finn and Glaser 2010; Greenwald et al. 2009; Iyengar, Messing, and Hahn 2011; Payne et al. 2010). Further research has examined the political impact of the implicit side of dual processes (Albertson 2011; Moss-Racusin, Phelan, and Rudman 2010; ¹The results in Study 3 were replicated using measures of automatic attitudes as reported in the online supporting information.
We take a different approach. Instead of Anecdotally, prejudiced acts by public figures center on this very concept, discussed in different language. Precisely because self-control over underlying biases is thought to be common, survey measures of racism and prejudice have been heavily contested, as leading scholars have developed creative tools to measure racism, prejudice, or bias unobtrusively to avoid triggering cognitive control. Such efforts include survey instruments measuring “symbolic,” “modern,” or “subtle” racism (Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay 1986; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), as well as newer techniques such as “list experiments” (Kuklinski et al. 1997; Sniderman and Carmines 1997) and measures of implicit biases (Greenwald et al. 1998; Payne et al. 2005). Research on Europe, too, has found that many individuals avoid expressing underlying biases when answering questions about prejudice (Akrami and Ekehammar 2005; Mählönen et al. 2011; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Nonetheless, most prior research has tried to evade the impact of such internalized social norms through measurement techniques, rather than modeling this impact directly. We take a different approach. Instead of seeking unobtrusive measures of “true” attitudes to out-groups, we consider directly the motivation to comply with norms that regulate the expression of underlying attitudes and biases.

The Antiprejudice Norm: Individual and Contextual Variation

Our view of migration and minority politics begins with a dual-process conception of attitudes in which automatic and controlled components combine to produce behavior. To apply this model, however, requires concrete hypotheses specific to the domain of intergroup attitudes. In this domain, divergence between automatic and controlled responses is common and works in one direction: the automatic response is often more negative toward out-group members than the controlled response (Dovidio and Gaertner 2010). This discrepancy comes from a crucial internal conflict prevalent among Western European citizens: many individuals who harbor negative biases against out-groups also consciously reject prejudice and strive to avoid expressing or acting upon such biases.

Considerable evidence supports the claim that social norms against prejudice exist and influence political behavior in contemporary Europe. Self-reported blatant racism is uncommon (Ford 2008; Mendelberg 2001; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), although it is detected more often in privacy (Sniderman and Haagedorn 2007). Moreover, there is widespread support for legal sanctions against prejudice and discrimination: 75% of British survey respondents supported a law sanctioning racial discrimination and 51% go further, supporting a law imposing special punishments for racially motivated attacks. Anecdotally, prejudiced acts by public figures are often severely criticized and even meet with formal sanctions, including sacking from public positions. In Germany, meanwhile, scholars argue that the antiprejudice norm is even stronger than elsewhere in Europe, due to the country’s Nazi legacy and the forceful political efforts to prevent extreme-right renewal in the postwar period (Art 2006; Mendelberg 2001, chap. 9). Debates over the appropriate balance between free speech and such social norms occur frequently, as seen in the recurring debates in Germany about whether to ban the extreme-right National Democratic Party (Art 2011).

Given the existence of both biases against out-groups and strong social norms against acting on such biases, what determines political choices on issues in domains where out-groups are salient? Some people, some of the time, will be motivated to curtail their negative impulses toward out-groups such as immigrants and ethnic minorities in order to conform to prevalent social norms. But which people, and in which circumstances?

2Mendelberg (2001, 2008) offers an important exception, showing the greater effectiveness of subtle racial appeals, presumably because they do not appear to violate the antiprejudice norm; however, her work on the direct effects of the norm yielded equivocal results (Mendelberg 2001, chap. 8). Our investigation of the antiprejudice norm takes a different approach. Whereas Mendelberg manipulated individuals’ feelings about whether or not they held normatively acceptable opinions and measured their tendency to adjust their behavior to social expectations, we instead manipulate the normative context of political choice itself and measure specific motivation to comply with the antiprejudice norm rather than a more general tendency to social conformity. These more directly relevant manipulations and measures turn out to yield clearer support for the theorized impact of the antiprejudice norm.

3These percentages are estimates from 1996, 1999, and 2003 British Social Attitudes Surveys (authors’ calculations).

4Some British examples include the sacking in 2002 of Conservative MP Anne Winterton for telling a racist joke at a private function; the 2004 sacking of football pundit Ron Atkinson following his use of a racial slur in a live television interview; and lengthy bans for two Premiership footballers in 2011 after they were caught on camera using racist language.
We begin by considering individual factors. As exemplified above, the antiprejudice norm is widely held, but individuals vary in their personal commitment to following it. Conceptually, this commitment constitutes not an attitude but a motivation, which in this case can be called the Motivation to Control Prejudice (see Dunton and Fazio 1997). Whereas attitudes are evaluations of people or objects, motivations represent wants or needs and lead to goal-directed action (Bargh, Gollwitzer, and Oettingen 2010). Motivations have both a direction (the goal itself) and an intensity (strength of the desire for that goal) (Plaks 2011). Further, motivations play a distinct role in generating behavior: in the dual-process logic, the “controlled” process is what brings behavior, such as the expression of political attitudes, into line with conscious normative commitments.

Our model hinges on the Motivation to Control Prejudice (MCP), a measure of commitment to the antiprejudice norm. MCP measures the intensity of an individual’s motivation to achieve the goal of unprejudiced behavior. Social psychologists have identified both internal and external motivations to act without prejudice (Plant and Devine 1998). Individuals may wish to avoid being perceived as prejudiced by others (external MCP), and they may also—or wish to—avoid appearing prejudiced even to themselves (internal MCP). We focus on the internal motivation to avoid prejudice since internalized norms will influence behavior not only in public but also in private settings, such as voting or expressing preferences anonymously on a web survey.\(^5\)

Motivation to control prejudice involves deliberate effort to avoid prejudiced actions, expressions, or thoughts. MCP works not by eliminating underlying prejudice, but by acting as a “brake” on potentially prejudiced actions or expressions. Having high levels of MCP differs from simply lacking prejudice both conceptually—MCP reflects a motivation rather than an attitude—and empirically (Plant and Devine 1998). In fact, automatically activated (implicit) bias is only weakly associated with MCP (Payne et al. 2005); the associations with conventional survey measures of anti-immigrant sentiment are stronger, but not overwhelmingly so.\(^6\) The critical point is that, at any given level of underlying bias, those motivated to control prejudice will be more inclined to avoid or suppress any act or belief that might reflect prejudice. Those with little such motivation will be more likely to act on the basis of their underlying feelings about outgroups, biased or not. In the political realm, this might involve taking positions on immigration or integration issues that are consistent with motivations. All else being equal, we therefore hypothesize that:

**H1 (Motivation Hypothesis): Individuals with greater motivation to control prejudice will be more likely to make pro-immigrant or pro-minority political choices.**

Turning from individual to contextual factors, we derive further hypotheses from additional social psychological work on how certain contextual factors trigger controlled (or norm-based) responses. In a series of field and lab experiments examining the norm against littering, Cialdini and colleagues found that both individual motivations and contextual factors predict rates of compliance with norms (Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990; Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini 2000). Individually, personal commitment to the antilittering norm (measured by a questionnaire, much like MCP) predicts compliance. Contextually, compliance increases when a norm is made salient, when a norm appears descriptive rather than merely prescriptive or injunctive, and, most important for our study, when an observed violation of a norm is clearer. This works straightforwardly in the antilittering example: more people clean up litter when they see two pieces of trash dropped rather than one.

We suggest the antiprejudice norm shapes political behavior much the way the antilittering norm shapes behavior in its context. Specifically, the antiprejudice norm should have more impact when contextual factors reduce ambiguity about the applicability of the norm (see Dovidio and Gaertner 2010 on ambiguity) What we mean by context here is the shared social meaning of situations in which political choices are made (Rolfe 2012, chap. 3). Of particular importance is whether or not race- or ethnicity-neutral arguments are available to justify discriminatory action (Crandall and Eshleman 2003). Given the norm against prejudice, citizens and political actors often argue for antiminority policies by reference to legitimate group-neutral social norms and values (Mendelberg 2001). Such arguments allow majority-group people to make choices that work against minorities or immigrants without appearing prejudiced to others or to themselves (Crandall and Eshleman 2003; cf. Pettigrew and Meertens 1995). Proponents of immigration restrictions, for example, can cite group-neutral concerns such as increased burdens on government resources, perceived

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\(^5\)Internal and external motivations are equally compatible with a controlled cognitive process (Plant and Devine 1998), even one that occurs quickly and without signs of overt deliberation. Conventional accounts of motivation still assume a controlled process (Bargh, Gollwitzer, and Oettingen 2010), although automatic responses may incorporate motivations given sufficient conditioning, as in the case of “chronic egalitarianism” (Moskowitz et al. 1999).

\(^6\)Correlations are reported in the online supporting information, Table SI.5.
negative economic impact, or an unintended reduction in support for welfare states.

Indeed, states make similar distinctions. In most European countries, for example, discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity in labor or housing markets is illegal. Some countries, additionally, punish certain expressions of prejudice. But at the same time, many countries accept policies which privilege citizens over foreigners, including restrictions on immigrants’ rights to travel, settle, own property, vote, and work. The granting of a superior set of rights and privileges to citizens seems a normal, legitimate part of the concept of citizenship, not a reflection of unacceptable prejudice (Miller 2000). We expect that voters who are motivated to avoid prejudice will make a similar distinction. They will be more supportive of discriminatory policies if there is lack of clarity regarding the citizenship status of the target group and more supportive if the citizenship status is clear.

Political actors and their reputations are another important aspect of the political context that can either reinforce or reduce ambiguity about the applicability of the antiprejudice norm. Western European anti-immigrant parties with unambiguous fascist legacies have mostly failed to mobilize widely, while radical right-wing parties without those ties have achieved considerable electoral success through anti-immigrant appeals (Carter 2005; Golder 2003; Ignazi 1992). Following our logic of contextual variation, we expect parties with clear racist or fascist reputations to activate the antiprejudice norm and, therefore, appeal to a narrower pool of potential voters than other parties that promote restrictions on immigration but do not have unambiguously racist reputations.

We thus predict that:

H2a (Normative Context Hypothesis): As the context in which the choice is presented puts antiprejudice norms more clearly at stake, discriminatory or antiminority political choices will be less common.

This contextual variation may work by providing or alternatively removing nonprejudiced justifications for discrimination or anti-immigrant sentiment. It may also work through association of a political position with political actors who have reputations for fascism or racism.

Motivations and context do not, however, act in isolation. They will also interact to influence political choice. Changes in the meaning of a political context will not have the same impact on all individuals. If we are right that changes in normative context work by increasing the relevance of the antiprejudice norm, then these contextual changes should have more impact on individuals with higher levels of motivation to control prejudice. This forms an alternative formulation of Hypothesis 2:

H2b (Norm-Motivation Interaction Hypothesis): Changing the normative context to place norms more clearly at stake will reduce antiminority responses more among high-motivation majority-group respondents than among low-motivation respondents.

Data and Methods

The empirical analysis in the article comes from three studies. The first two studies are survey experiments, embedded in two separate sample surveys of the general population in Britain: the third wave of the British Comparative Campaign Analysis Project (B/CCAP) fielded in 2009 (n = 1405) by the survey firm YouGov and the Continuous Monitoring Survey (CMS) fielded by the British Election Study in January 2010 (n = 945). The third study is a conventional regression analysis of party support, using data collected as part of the CCAP studies in both Britain and Germany (De/CCAP). The CCAP (Nuffield College 2009) and CMS (Clarke et al. 2011) surveys were administered to web-based samples of respondents recruited to create a demographically representative sample of the respective national populations (see Twyman 2008; Whiteley et al. 2010).

The three studies share one unique common component: a measure of internal motivation to control prejudice, not available elsewhere in surveys of nationally representative population samples. We measure MCP on both CCAPs using items from American social psychological research (Dunton and Fazio 1997; Plant and Devine 1998) previously adapted and validated for a European context (Ivarsflaten, Blinder, and Ford 2010). These items invoke normative principles (“I aim to be nonprejudiced towards immigrants due to my own convictions”) or probe whether respondents associate negative emotions with prejudice (“I feel guilty when I have a negative thought about immigrants”). In the CMS, a condensed version (with two questions, both focusing on normative principles) of the measure was used.7

Our empirical tests also require variation in normative context—specifically, variation in both the availability of legitimate-sounding arguments justifying discrimination and the reputations of the political parties making those arguments. We generate such variation through controlled experimentation in the first two studies

7 MCP items and scale construction are detailed in the online supporting information (Section II, Tables SI.2 and SI.3).
described below. In the third study, we capture normative variation through differences in political parties’ reputations. Both the British and German samples include legitimate mainstream parties associated with restrictionist policies—Conservatives and CDU/CSU—and extreme-right parties with a reputation for racism and ties to fascism—the British National Party (BNP) and the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD).

**Study 1: Antiprejudice Norms and Citizenship Cues**

Western national governments are expected to treat all their citizens equally. A strong social norm, often backed up by law, prohibits discrimination against citizens based on their race, ethnicity, religion, or prior immigration status. In our first experiment, we manipulate the citizenship status of a stigmatized out-group (asylum seekers), as antiprejudice norms should apply much more clearly to citizens than to those of questionable citizenship status. We used a split-ballot survey with an experimental format, randomly assigning respondents to one of two question conditions, as follows:

(a) “Do you think asylum seekers should have the same access to jobs and benefits as everyone else?”

(b) “Do you think asylum seekers who have been granted citizenship should have the same access to jobs and benefits as everyone else?”

In condition (b), the clear reference to citizenship places the antiprejudice norm clearly at stake. We derive the following expectations from our hypotheses. First, from the Motivation Hypothesis (H1), we predict that those with higher MCP will be more supportive of treating asylum seekers equally in either condition. Second, from the Normative Context Hypothesis (H2a), we predict higher overall support for equal treatment when asylum seekers are described as citizens because this description puts the antiprejudice norm more clearly at stake. Third, we expect an interaction between MCP and the experimental treatment (H2b): those with higher MCP will be more strongly influenced by the presence of the “citizenship” cue. Those who are more motivated to comply with the antiprejudice norm will react more strongly to a cue that clearly puts the norm at stake. These effects should hold even when controlling for anti-immigrant sentiment—while negative views about immigrants will pull respondents in one direction, the controlled process of acting in accordance with social norms and values will pull them the opposite way.

**Results**

Figure 1 shows the estimated effects of the citizenship-cue manipulation, motivation to control prejudice, and anti-immigrant sentiment. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, MCP shows a positive correlation with support for equal treatment of asylum seekers. As predicted by Hypothesis 2a, the citizenship cue also significantly boosts support for equal access to jobs and benefits. The effects of both individual MCP and the citizenship-cue manipulation are substantial, as illustrated by comparison to the impact of anti-immigrant sentiment. Moving from the lowest to highest score on the MCP scale increases support for equal treatment of asylum seekers by 0.34 points on the 0–1 scale, the presence of a citizenship cue increases support by 0.22 points, while moving from the lowest to highest level of anti-immigrant sentiment reduces support by 0.42 points. These findings support Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2a: both individual sensitivity to the antiprejudice norm and contextual cues increasing the salience of the norm are associated with statistically and substantively significant increases in support for treating asylum seekers equally.10

To test for the predicted interaction effect, we split respondents into high and low categories of MCP at the median of the scale. We then interacted this binary measure with a dummy variable representing the citizenship experimental manipulation. The interaction has a statistically significant effect (p < 0.01), illustrated in Figure 2, showing that high MCP individuals respond more strongly to the citizenship cue. This pattern fits the prediction from Hypothesis 2b: individuals above the median on the MCP scale (gray points and line) respond more strongly to the
FIGURE 1 Estimated Effects of Citizenship Cue, Motivation to Control Prejudice, and Hostility to Immigrants on Support for Equal Treatment of Asylum Seekers

Source: Comparative Campaign Analysis Project, British sample. N = 665. Motivation to Control Prejudice and Immigration Attitudes measured on 0–1 scale.

Study 2: Antiprejudice Norms and Political Messages: The Muslim Schools Experiment

Our second experiment examines the influence of MCP on the willingness to discriminate against a different stigmatized out-group: British Muslims. As before, we expect (H1) that those who score high on MCP will be less willing to support a potentially discriminatory policy; (H2a) that the presence of a contextual signal indicating the norm is at stake will reduce support for the discriminatory policy; and (H2b) that voters scoring high on MCP will respond more strongly to such contextual signals.

The dependent variable measure asked British survey respondents whether Muslims should be able to found Islamic schools that follow the British national curriculum, as other religious groups in Britain do. Religious schools are an established part of the British education system—the Church of England, the Catholic church, and Jewish religious groups all run large numbers of schools—but Islamic schools have proved more controversial, owing to concerns about the perceived threat of Islam and the integration of Muslim communities (Cantle 2001).

The experiment randomly assigned respondents to different treatment conditions that manipulated both the message they received about Islamic schools and the party
endorsing this message. In a control condition, respondents were simply given a description of Islamic schools before being asked the dependent variable question. In the “message” conditions, the respondents were additionally presented with a nonprejudiced argument against Muslim schools, claiming that they encourage social segregation and the promotion of extremist views, before being asked whether they supported the foundation of such schools. This group-neutral argument should reassure respondents that opposing Islamic schools is not discriminatory and should therefore increase opposition to the schools (H2a). This manipulation is thus the inverse of the citizenship manipulation in Study 1; rather than removing justifications for disparate treatment other than prejudice, here we provide a justification for those respondents willing to take it.

We manipulate the normative context in another way with the “messenger” conditions. Here, the same argument is attributed to different political parties, including the mainstream center-right Conservative party, the extreme-right British National Party (BNP), and the fringe-right UK Independence Party (UKIP). As noted above, the reputations of parties can be a contextual trigger of norm-motivated behavior; thus, we expect the impact of the message to depend on the reputation of the messenger. A message backed by a mainstream party should further reassure voters that discrimination is socially acceptable in this context; thus, opposition to Islamic schools should increase with Conservative party endorsement, by the logic of Hypothesis 2a.

Endorsement by an extreme-right party should have the opposite effect, provided that the extreme-right party itself is strongly associated with racism. In the British case, the BNP carries such a reputation (Goodwin 2011); when the BNP is the “messenger,” we thus expect opposition to Muslim schools to fall (H2a). Furthermore, those who express stronger allegiance to antiprejudice norms should be more strongly influenced by the normative signal. Therefore, when we compare the Conservatives and BNP messenger conditions, we expect larger differences in expressed support for Islamic schools among high MCP voters (H2b).

Of course, the BNP might prove less effective simply because it is a fringe party with less credibility in general, rather than due to its racist reputation. Thus, we examine responses to another messenger, the UKIP, also a fringe right-wing party with a strongly anti-immigration platform but with a primary reputation for Euroskepticism rather than racism. If we are correct that the normative context surrounding issues of racism, rather than a general lack of credibility, drives different responses to party cues, then the UKIP treatment should not trigger the same response as the BNP treatment. Rather, results should be similar in the UKIP and Conservative messenger conditions.

Results

Table 1 shows the effects of motivation to control prejudice, the discriminatory message manipulation with and without party endorsements, and the interaction between MCP and the BNP-endorsed message condition in ordinary least squares and ordered logistic regression models. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, those scoring high on MCP show consistently lower opposition to Islamic schools, even after controlling for their attitudes to Muslims as a group. Also consistent with expectations (H2a), respondents presented with an argument legitimating discrimination against Muslims were significantly more likely to oppose Islamic schools than those in the control condition, as long as this argument was not presented by the BNP. However, support for Hypothesis 2a was equivocal, as endorsement by a legitimate party did not have any effect over and above the antischools argument presented alone, and the differences between the BNP condition and the legitimate party conditions were not statistically significant in the absence of interaction effects.

The model also reveals an important interaction between MCP and endorsement by the BNP. Recall that those who are more motivated to control their prejudice should be more sensitive to contextual cues (H2b). To
test this, we again split scores on the MCP measure at the median and interacted the MCP scores with each message condition. Interactions with legitimate messengers were not significant, but attitudes diverged significantly when the discriminatory opposition to Muslim schools was endorsed by the extreme-right BNP. Figure 3 illustrates this interaction effect, comparing the predicted levels of opposition to Islamic schools for those with high and low MCP when exposed to Conservative- and BNP-endorsed messages.14

The Conservative-endorsed message is associated with elevated opposition to Islamic schools regardless of MCP level, but the effects of the BNP message depend strongly on voters’ motivations to control prejudice. Respondents with low MCP show the same level of opposition to Islamic schools as similar respondents exposed to the Conservative-endorsed message. Respondents with high MCP, though, behave differently: their estimated opposition to Islamic schools is significantly lower in the BNP condition than the Conservative condition. This result again supports Hypothesis 2b: respondents motivated to control prejudice react more strongly to the contextual cue of BNP endorsement, which signals that opposing Islamic schools may be an illegitimate form of discrimination.

Overall, evidence from Study 2 shows that variation in individual MCP is associated with theoretically predictable and substantively important variation in political behavior, both by reducing general support for a discriminatory policy (H1) and by conditioning reactions to the policy when it is endorsed by extremists (H2b). Next, we show that the effects of MCP generalize to a broader test of political behavior, namely support for extremist parties in two different countries.

14Responses to the UKIP message closely resemble responses to the Conservative message (see SI.9, SI.17m, and SI.18) but are omitted for presentational reasons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Ordinary Least Squares</th>
<th>Model 2: Ordered Logistic Regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept (OLS)</td>
<td>0.66*** (0.04)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 1 (Ordered Logit)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>−3.27*** (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 2 (Ordered Logit)</td>
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<td>−1.23*** (0.19)</td>
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<td>Cut point 3 (Ordered Logit)</td>
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<td>−0.41* (0.19)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cut point 4 (Ordered Logit)</td>
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<td>0.69** (0.19)</td>
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<td>Message condition: Control</td>
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<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message condition: Message only</td>
<td>0.07** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.46* (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message condition: Conservative-endorsed message</td>
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<td>0.44* (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message condition: UKIP-endorsed message</td>
<td>0.06* (0.03)</td>
<td>0.40* (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message condition: BNP-endorsed message</td>
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<td>0.63 (0.33)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Muslim sentiment (0–1 scale)</td>
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<td>Motivation to control prejudice: below median</td>
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<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation to control prejudice: above median</td>
<td>−0.06** (0.02)</td>
<td>−0.46** (0.14)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Interaction: High MCP+BNP message</td>
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<td>Adjusted R squared/pseudo-r squared</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N | 893 | 893 |

Note: Dependent variable is scaled from 0 to 1. Controls for other message conditions also included but not shown (see supporting materials for details).

Source: British Election Study Continuous Monitoring Survey, January 2010.
attitudes toward out-groups. We focus in particular on support for extreme-right parties who mobilize hostility to immigration: we expect that voters who are hostile to immigrants will gravitate to such parties but that those who in addition are sensitive to the antiprejudice norm will be reluctant to support parties that are regarded as agents of prejudice or intolerance, even if they agree with their policies.

We test these hypotheses using multinomial logistic regressions of respondents’ vote preferences in B/CCAP and De/CCAP data. We control for typical predictors of vote choice, testing the robustness of our finding in a range of models with controls for demographics, opinions of the main party leaders, issue attitudes, subjective economic perceptions, political interest, satisfaction with democracy, and identification with the main parties.\(^{15}\) We also test the impact of MCP in separate models controlling for conventional measures of anti-immigrant sentiment and implicit antiminority bias using a version of Payne’s AMP (see the online supporting information, Section II.3).

The baseline prediction, based on conventional issue-voting models, is that anti-immigrant sentiment will be associated with increased support for parties proposing greater restrictions on immigration and integration policies that emphasize the majority culture and values. In Britain, this implies that those hostile to immigrants will gravitate toward the center-right Conservative party and the fringe-right UKIP and BNP and away from the center-left Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. In Germany, anti-immigrant sentiment should encourage support for the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Free Democrats (FDP) and for the fringe extreme-right parties such as the National Democratic Party (NDP), Deutsche Volksunion (DVU), and die Republikaner (Rep), and it should discourage support for the center-left Social Democrats and Greens and the left-wing Linke party.

The antiprejudice norm should counteract this general tendency, but only for parties whose reputations for racism and extremism lead it to fall foul of the antiracism norm. This follows from both our hypotheses: supporting a racist, extremist party will be regarded as an antiminority choice (H1), and the extremist reputation of such parties will place such norms clearly at stake in a way which will not be true for more moderate parties (H2b). As such, we expect a negative correlation between MCP scores and support for parties pursuing anti-immigration policies. Both the BNP and the German right-wing extremist parties, especially the NDP, have fascist and racist reputations

\(^{15}\)Full details of the robustness of the main coefficients to a range of different specifications are provided in the online supporting information (Section IV).
and are regarded by mainstream political elites as illegitimate. We expect voters sensitive to the antiprejudice norm to react to such negative reputations by recognizing that support for these parties is an endorsement of discriminatory policies and falls foul of the antiracism norm.

Crucially, we expect Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2b to hold, even controlling for attitudes to out-groups. Results including these controls are important because they point to a key implication of our argument—that citizens with a strong motivation to control prejudice will be less likely to translate hostility to out-groups into support for antiminority political parties with reputations for normatively unacceptable behavior. As a result, the reputation of an anti-immigrant political party can be as important as its policy proposals in determining its potential support. Even anti-immigration voters cannot be easily mobilized by parties and messages that are perceived to violate the antiprejudice norm.

## Results

Figure 4 shows the estimated beta coefficients for immigration attitudes and MCP in a multinomial logistic regression model predicting party support in Britain. We find the expected pattern of relationships. First, explicit anti-immigrant sentiment is associated with elevated support for the anti-immigration parties of the right, but more strongly for the fringe or extreme right (UKIP, BNP) than for the center-right Conservatives. Next, as hypothesized, MCP discourages support for the illegitimate BNP, but not for the legitimate center-right Conservatives. MCP also reduces support somewhat for the UKIP, suggesting some voters also have concerns about this party’s antiminority policies, or its reputation more broadly, though these did not surface in our experimental results.

Notably, these results further show that conventional measures of anti-immigrant sentiment and motivation to control prejudice are not mere mirror images. Anti-immigrant sentiment increases support for all three parties of the right, but, by contrast, motivation to control prejudice influences support for the mainstream and the extreme right differently.

Figure 5 presents results from multinomial logit models using German voting intentions in Wave 2 of the British parties: the Conservatives, Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the UKIP, and the BNP. The effects found here are robust to more elaborate controls, as detailed in the online supporting information (Section IV).

17A similar pattern emerges using the implicit measure of antiminority bias (AMP), shown in the supporting materials (Tables SI.20 and SI.24), although fewer of the coefficients are statistically significant, possibly due to a much lower sample size. The MCP coefficients, however, remain significant as predictors of vote choice even in this limited sample when controlling for implicit bias.
De/CCAP data, but otherwise similar to those used to create Figure 4.\(^\text{18}\) The radical-right voting option includes the main far-right party—the NDP—along with two other small extreme-right parties.\(^\text{19}\) Again, the findings support our model. Negative sentiment toward immigrants is strongly correlated with support for the radical and extreme right-wing parties and inversely associated with support for the Greens, who support liberal policies on migration and whose co-chair since 2008, Cem Ozdemir, is of Turkish immigrant descent. There is no correlation with the main center-right parties, perhaps reflecting the relatively low salience of immigration in German politics at the time of the survey.

The effects of MCP run in the opposite direction, as in Britain. MCP significantly reduces support for right-wing extremists but has no significant effect on preferences for any of the mainstream parties, right or left, confirming our expectations. As in the British study, we see that the conventional survey measure of anti-immigrant sentiment and MCP are not mirror images. While anti-immigrant sentiment is associated with less support for the liberal Green party, MCP has no effect on support for this party.

In a final test of the effects of the antiprejudice norm on voting, we illuminate another difference between normative concerns and conventional issue preferences. We expect voters who are normatively motivated to act without prejudice to rule out illegitimate parties entirely: while their preferences for other parties may wax and wane, extremist parties should be “beyond the pale” for voters motivated to conform to the social norm against prejudice and discrimination. We exploit the panel nature of the B/CCAP and De/CCAP datasets to test this, constructing new binary variables for whether a respondent ever expresses support for the extreme right in any of the six survey waves. Our expectation is that those scoring higher on the MCP scale will be less likely to do so, even after controlling for conventional measures of anti-immigrant sentiment and other factors.

The analysis bears out this expectation. Figure 6 plots the predicted probability of ever expressing support for an extreme-right party in each country against MCP for an individual who does not identify with any of the major parties and has an average level of anti-immigrant sentiment. The likelihood of ever expressing such support declines sharply at higher levels of MCP in both

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\(^\text{18}\)German voters cast two ballots at elections—one for individual constituency candidates and one for regional party lists. These models focus on the party-list vote preference, where support for minor parties is higher and voters are less likely to be swayed by individual candidates, so preferences more closely reflect attitudes to the parties.

\(^\text{19}\)The radical-right voting option was constructed from open-ended responses by those indicating they would vote for an “other” party. As well as the NDP, this option includes the Republikaner, the DVU, and those who expressed support for the leaders of one of these parties.
countries. The decline is sharper in Germany, perhaps reflecting the lower legitimacy of the German extreme right and the stronger social norm against expressing support for it due to the Nazi legacy (Art 2006).

**Discussion**

In this article, we have proposed that political behavior relating to race and immigration can be better understood as the outcome of a dual process, with many individuals pulled in opposite directions by biases against minority groups on one hand and a motivation to control such biases in accordance with social norms on the other. The interaction between antiminority attitudes and the motivation to control prejudice helps to explain some of the puzzles of ethnic politics: why many citizens endorse discrimination against foreigners even as they condemn the same discrimination against citizens of the same backgrounds; why antiminority messages are more potent when they come from a source viewed as legitimate; and why parties that focus solely on mobilizing hostility to immigration and minorities are less able to recruit voters concerned about these issues. A clear focus on the antiprejudice norm, and on individual and contextual variation in its force, adds explanatory power in each of these cases. These findings have several implications for both research and practical politics.

First, our approach provides new leverage on the long-standing, contentious debate about the relative merits of “blatant” or “subtle/symbolic/modern” measures of racial prejudice in the United States (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Schuman 2000) and Europe (Coenders et al. 2001; Pettigrew et al. 1995). Immigration and race policy preferences need not stem from either “principled politics” or “subtle racism” or from some unspecified blend of the two. Rather, our model suggests an ever-present interaction between politics and prejudice. Individual motivation and normative context jointly determine whether antiprejudice values or negative affect toward minorities or immigrants hold sway for a given individual facing a particular political choice. With the benefit of decades of social psychological research since the early debates over symbolic racism, we can now measure these factors and specify more precisely how they combine to shape political choices. Our model and measures can separate group-based hostility from norm-based control of this hostility, in a way that was not possible in previous formulations, such as Kinder and Sears’ (1981) “blend” of antiblack affect with individualistic values. Thus, our approach may help to address the long-standing problem that symbolic racism measures may confound racism with political principles (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Hochschild 2000; Sniderman and Carmines 1997).

Next, our findings suggest that the structure of normative boundaries merits sustained attention in research and political practice. Normative boundaries determine when majority-group publics police attitudes about minority groups and shape citizens’ judgments about the legitimacy of political actors who seek to mobilize hostility toward minorities. In our first study, we showed how the category of citizenship functions as a normative boundary, protecting those inside its reach. Salient political conflicts may erode normative protection for groups perceived as threatening to important social values, or even to basic security. For example, terrorist attacks committed by members of a particular group may lead voters to regard discriminatory actions against this group as a legitimate response to threat. As fear dissolves social norms against prejudice toward the threatening group, hostility previously held in check may come to the surface and encourage support for policies targeting disliked minorities (Kam and Kinder 2007; Petersen, Slothuus, and Togeby 2010; Street and Kelley 2009). Similar effects may occur when members of groups come to be regarded as transgressing widely held social norms, for example in perceptions of minorities as committing crimes (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000) or exploiting the
welfare state (Gilens 1999). Such arguments are widely used by right-wing media and politicians and are often attacked as expressions of prejudice. Our research suggests a more precise interpretation—such arguments provide legitimating justifications for discrimination against such groups, placing them outside the boundaries of normative protection (cf. Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

Our findings also point to the importance of the reputations of political actors who make arguments about immigrant or minority-related policy. Antiminority politicians often justify their positions in race-neutral terms, suggesting a recognition that voters motivated to avoid prejudice will reject arguments that appear designed solely to elicit group-based antipathy. Our second experiment demonstrated how political influence depends on reputation: when we attributed an antiminority position to the BNP, an organization with a violent fascist legacy, it failed to mobilize voters with high motivation to control prejudice. When the position was attributed to the Conservative party, it increased support for the discriminatory policy among all respondents. In our third study, we showed how antiprejudice norms pull voters away from extremist parties, even if they support the policies these parties espouse.

Of course, unlike the BNP, many parties and politicians have more ambiguous reputations. Future research should examine how political actors acquire or change these reputations and in particular how they use the antiprejudice norm. For example, a history of attention to issues other than immigration may function as a “reputational shield” to rebut charges of prejudice and enable a party to adopt radical-right positions while retaining legitimacy. Conversely, a history of mobilizing prejudice may prevent a party with an extremist legacy from building a broader base of support, even if it attempts to adopt more moderate positions. The failure of the BNP to gain mainstream acceptance, despite a decade of efforts to build a more moderate image, speaks to the power of reputational legacies (Goodwin 2011).

These complex trade-offs between the popularity of policies and their impact on reputation underscore the complexity of today’s politics of immigration and integration in Europe, as politicians seek to balance the contradictory demands of an internally conflicted electorate. European politicians constantly play a dual game when addressing this policy area. They must respond to antiminority and anti-immigrant sentiment while also ensuring that their responses do not fall foul of the antiprejudice norm. They must try to build the legitimacy of their own messages while simultaneously undermining their opponents’, and they must either respond to or try to shift the public’s view of what is normatively acceptable. A great deal remains to be done to disentangle the often paradoxical dynamics of citizens pulled one way by the currents of prejudice and another by the “better angels of their natures.” We suggest that future research, as well as considering the role of prejudice in public attitudes, should examine directly the workings of the antiprejudice norm and its manifestations in party reputations, boundaries of normative protection, and individual-level motivations to avoid prejudice.

References


Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s website:

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